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1 2	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK		
3	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA		.Y.
4	V.	19 Cr. 521	(PKC)
5	PETER BRIGHT,		
6	Defendant.		
7	x		
8		February 7, 2:30 p.m.	2020
9		2000 F	
10	Before:		
11	HON. P. KEVIN CASTEL,		
12		District Ju	dge
13			
14	APPEARANCES		
15	GEOFFREY S. BERMAN United States Attorney for the		
16	Southern District of BY: ALEXANDER LI	of New York	
17	TIMOTHY T. HOWARD Assistant United States Attorneys		
18	FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF NEW YORK Attorneys for Defendant BY: ZAWADI BAHARANYI		
19			
20	AMY GALLICCHIO		
21		H JENSEN, Special Agent, FBI RAYES, Paralegal, Federal De	fenders
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(Case called)

THE DEPUTY CLERK: For the government.

MR. LI: Good afternoon, your Honor. Alexander Li and Timothy Howard for the government.

THE COURT: Good afternoon to you both.

MR. LI: Good afternoon. With us is FBI special agent Elizabeth Jensen.

THE COURT: All right, Ms. Jensen. Good afternoon.

And for the defendant?

MS. GALLICCHIO: Good afternoon, your Honor. Federal Defenders by Amy Gallicchio with Zawadi Baharanyi. Also present with us is Alondrda Rayes, who is paralegal on this matter, and of course Mr. Bright.

THE COURT: Good afternoon to you all.

So, I have a number of *in limine* motions. I may start with some questions and I will give you an opportunity. If there is anything else that anybody else wants to say, they can.

Now, it comes up a couple of times in the excerpts. There is a reference to the 17-year-old with the 14-year-old sister, there is a 2011 conversation in which there is a reference to a pop star. The question is why does any conversation regarding a 17-year-old, who is above the age of consent in New York, come in?

MR. LI: Your Honor, I think it is relevant for two

reasons and both pertain to the defendant's intent.

First, your Honor, a 17-year-old, although it is within the age of consent in New York, for federal child pornography law purposes that is a person, a minor. That is a minor for purposes of the child pornography laws. The defendant's stated in parts of his post-arrest statement that he received "a nudish photograph" from the 17-year-old girl. I think this puts this case squarely in the framework of *United States v. Brand* where the Second Circuit held that child pornography is relevant to the question of intent in a child entitlement case because it goes to whether the defendant has an abnormal sexual attraction to children.

THE COURT: So what you would say is I should say to the jury: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, as I will tell you at the conclusion of this case, the age of legal consent in New York is 17 and the defendant can only be convicted of this crime if the person who he was seeking to entice is below the age of 17. Yet, in the case of child pornography, with which he is not charged, it could be a piece of child pornography which happens to be against a federal statute if communicated by a facility of interstate commerce or a wire if the person is under the age of 18.

Is that what you want me to tell the jury? Or just don't bother telling them that second part? Or the first part?

MR. LI: Your Honor, I think this does go to the

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question of the defendant's intent. I think a limiting instruction can cabin some of the concerns that the Court has.

THE COURT: What I am asking you is wouldn't I have to tell the jury all of that?

MR. LI: I don't think the Court would need to tell the jury all of that.

> THE COURT: So, give me your limiting instruction. (Counsel conferring)

MR. LI: Your Honor, I think the instruction would be that the defendant is not charged with child pornography. Whether in fact he received child pornography is not at issue. The statement that the defendant might have -- the defendant's own admission that he might have received a nudish photograph or that he did receive a nudish photograph from this 17-year-old should only be used for the purpose of his intent to commit the crime of child enticement, that is, whether he intended --

THE COURT: But what you are leaving out of your limiting instruction -- the question that I asked you was about the limiting instruction so let's talk about this. What you are leaving out of your limiting instruction is that it's unlawful to possess a sexually explicit picture of someone between the age of 17 and 18. I am trying to get this jury to understand that they can only convict if the intended persons who were enticed were below 17, even though the statute refers

to the 18-year threshold. That's a concept that this jury needs to understand. I can't just say something about, well, child pornography, in general, without saying to them even though you can't be convicted of the crime unless the intended victims were below 17, you could be convicted of the crime of child pornography if it is a nude image of someone between 17 and 18. Wouldn't I have to tell them that? Otherwise, how would they know what child pornography is?

MR. LI: Your Honor, I don't think the jury needs to understand the concept of child pornography or the legal concept of child pornography because that legal concept is not at issue.

THE COURT: How would they know it was child pornography?

MR. LI: The jury only needs to know the fact that he received an image from someone who he believed to be 17 years old and that picture was nudish and that that is sufficient for them to infer the intent that he sexually --

THE COURT: Would it be a fair inference if the child was 18?

MR. LI: No, your Honor. We would not be arguing for that inference if the child was 18.

THE COURT: That's the problem you have here, is that there is a distinction as to age and there is a distinction in the case of child pornography that the child could be between

17 and 18 and it would be child pornography, but below 17 they can't be guilty of the crime charged here under 2422(b).

MR. LI: That is right, your Honor. I agree that there is a legal distinction that the Court has referenced between child pornography and the federal case --

THE COURT: Oh, you and I get that. Everybody here gets that. The question is what I tell the jury and I told you what I proposed to tell the jury if I were going to let this in and you said, oh no, Judge, don't do that.

MR. LI: Your Honor, maybe if I could go on to the second reason why we think this is relevant and then we can circle back to the limiting instruction that the Court would potentially enter.

THE COURT: Does this relate to the 17 and 14-year-olds but not to the pop star?

MR. LI: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So this, what you are about to tell me has nothing to do with the pop star.

MR. LI: Correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. And your second reason is because it reflects that this man had no intention of informing or his intent to inform law enforcement of bad conduct.

MR. LI: Yes. That's exactly right, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, we are going to put that one aside because I have some questions for the defendant on that

but at this stage of the game references to the pop star above the age of 17 and to what you characterize as the quote or the defendant characterized as the "nudish" pictures of the 17-year-old are out because, under 404(b) grounds, which is a consideration on prior similar act testimony because of the danger of unfair prejudice and jury confusion, quite frankly, because I would have to explain how the distinction between a person a day over 17 for the purposes of 2422(b) versus the child pornography laws, and that would lead to juror confusion.

MR. LI: I understand the ruling of the Court, your Honor.

Just so the Court is aware, some of the post-arrest videos talk about the 17-year-old and the 14-year-old essentially in the same sentence. We will work with the defense to sort of parse this out as best we can but I just wanted to let the Court know.

THE COURT: Either that or I can give a limiting instruction that you can only consider -- it can't be parsed out, then I would allow it in, but I would say you can't consider the references to the 17-year-old as prior similar act testimony but, to the best of your ability, filter it out.

MR. LI: We will do that, your Honor. Just to be clear, the Court is also saying the references to the 13-year-old pop star should come in?

THE COURT: 13-year-old?

1 MR. LI: Yes, your Honor; the pop star was a 2 13-year-old. 3 THE COURT: No. There is a 17-year-old pop star and a 4 13-year-old pop star. I'm only talking about the 17-year-old 5 pop star. 6 MR. LI: Your Honor, the 17-year-old is not a pop 7 The 17-year-old is an individual that the defendant claimed he was communicating with. 8 9 THE COURT: Well, I'm talking about the man's name is 10 Justin Bieber. 11 MR. LI: Okay, your Honor. 12 THE COURT: Is that something you are planning on 13 offering? 14 MR. LI: No, it was not, your Honor. 15 16 17 18

THE COURT: Well, why is it in the motion papers before me? I didn't see you disclaim that as what you were seeking to offer in the 2011 conversation. I am looking at it, it is on file at document 29-2, filed on January 24th, page 2 of 2.

MS. GALLICCHIO: Your Honor, maybe I can clear that up?

THE COURT: Yes.

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MS. GALLICCHIO: I actually submitted the entire chat log to the Court so that the Court could read what the government was seeking to introduce in context because I

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thought the context of that statement was relevant.

THE COURT: So, where do I find what the government seeks to introduce?

MS. GALLICCHIO: It is in that section.

THE COURT: No, no, no. I am asking what -- I understand what your point is --

MS. GALLICCHIO: Right.

THE COURT: -- that there is the universe and then there is some subset of that that they're seeking to introduce.

Where do I find the subset?

MR. LI: Your Honor, it's in our motion in limine paper in document no. 23 on page 3.

THE COURT: I apologize.

(pause)

THE COURT: And on the 2011 conversation all you are offering is that portion?

MR. LI: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So that makes it a lot easier.

That makes it a lot easier. Fine.

MR. LI: Okay.

THE COURT: So, we are good there. And I apologize, I looked at the full transcripts as the best source of the information. Okay.

MS. GALLICCHIO: Your Honor, just if I may?

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. GALLICCHIO: With respect to that, if the Court is ruling to allow that in we would be seeking for the entire conversation to come in or a large portion of it, so that that comment is placed in context. I don't know whether the government has an objection to that and it may be something that we can work on a compromise on but --

THE COURT: Well, what you have to tell me is taking the July 29, 2011, are you seeking to offer each and every word of it or something else less than each and every word?

MR. LI: Your Honor, based on our discussions with the defense, we would propose to offer the entire chat because we understand that the defense wants to use other portions of that chat and so we would offer the entire chat message and then the government is only going to be arguing from these five sentences.

THE COURT: I think what you mean to be telling me is something different than that which is you're offering what's on page 3. You have no objection if the defendant wants to offer the balance under the rule of completeness.

Is that what you are telling me? Or do you want to offer the whole thing.

MR. LI: We are prepared to do it either way but just to make it easier for everyone, we are prepared to offer the entire thing.

THE COURT: If you do then I'm going to rule against

you because I'm excluding certain portions that you can't get into evidence. Whether the defendant can get it into evidence is a different standard.

MR. LI: I understand, your Honor. Then we will offer just these five sentences.

THE COURT: Right. But under the rule of completeness if the defendant seeks to offer other portions of it at the same time they will come in at the same time.

MR. LI: We have no objection to that, your Honor.

THE COURT: And that's what you want to do, right?

MS. GALLICCHIO: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So that's fine, but let's just look at the excerpts on page 3 of the government's *in limine* motion A, B, and C. Is there a reason for me to exclude those portions that you want to argue or do you want to just stand on your arguments in your brief?

 $\label{eq:MS.GALLICCHIO:} \text{MS. GALLICCHIO:} \quad \text{Your Honor, I stand on my arguments.}$  I think I fleshed them out.

THE COURT: All right.

MS. GALLICCHIO: I also ask that they be placed in context as with the prior.

THE COURT: So you will get together with the government and see what you can agree on under the rule of completeness, but what I am permitting the government to do is what appears under A, B, and C, on document 23, page 3.

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Now, since this has come up, what you are seeking with regard to the so-called rape law tweet and the jail bait tweets are what you have quoted in numbers 1 and 2 on page 2; is that correct?

MR. LI: That is correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. And the defense stands on its arguments in its brief?

MS. GALLICCHIO: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: I'm going to allow 1 and 2 in. I will say a little bit more about that in some of my comments, and then you have heard what I have said about what is item 4, the direct child communications on page 3 going on to 4 of the government's brief. And I will just say for the record that Rule 404(b) provides that evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act, is admissible for purposes of proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or lack of accident and it is subject to a four-factor test, whether the evidence is offered for a proper purpose, whether the evidence is relevant to the material issues in dispute, whether its probative value is substantially outweighed by prejudicial effect, and whether it's going to be admitted with a limiting instruction if requested by the defendant. The Second Circuit takes an inclusionary approach to prior acts whereby evidence is admissible for any purpose other than to show criminal propensity and the government is

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required to establish only a similarity or some connection to establish that a prior act is relevant to one of the other elements, in this case intent of the crime charged. In order to be relevant, the evidence must be sufficiently similar to the conduct at issue to permit the jury reasonably to draw from that act the state of mind inference advocated by the proponent and so that's where I believe that the evidence comes in. true that the defense has the argument that Bright was not speaking literally and that these posts and chats are either too far in the past to be relevant or were either comments on the arbitrariness of statutory rape laws or crude and tasteless jokes and playful banter. And it seems to me that that's a question of the weight, if any, to be given to the statements by the jury and of course I am, if the defendants request, going to give a limiting instruction that some of the tweets are from 2019 and 2013 and that the Google chats are from 2010, 2012 is not a basis to exclude. The Circuit has affirmed the admission of prior act testimony that was as much as 15 years before the charged crime or charged conduct. That's the Larson case and they pointed out that there is no bright-line rule on age, that's the Mostafa case, and here I find that there is sufficiently relevant and probative evidence and there is nothing about the age which makes them less so.

Now, let me find out from the defense, because this is kind of a guiding -- may be a guiding principle for me. What

is the theory of the case with regard to whether these were adult role play, or whether these were efforts to catch a predator, or both? What is the theory of the defense?

MS. GALLICCHIO: So, your Honor, I am prepared to do that. I just would ask the Court to ask that Agent Jensen step out of the courtroom. She is the agent, the undercover agent, and so I would ask that she --

THE COURT: I think that's fine. I think that's a reasonable request and I'm going to grant it.

(Agent leaves the courtroom)

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MS. GALLICCHIO: Yes. Thank you, your Honor.

So, it is our theory, as we I think we have laid out or touched on in our papers, your Honor, that Mr. Bright began engaging with who turned out to be an undercover agent, under the belief that he was engaging in a kinky chat room with an adult who is engaging in a sexual practice known as role playing or age playing where adults regress in age and take on the persona and actions of a different age; a child perhaps, an infant. It's a kink that people engage in. And, it is something that he has engaged in on many occasions. The government does concede that, that he is a practicing age-player with consenting adults and that he was in a dating site called Kinked — it's name tells you a lot — and it is a place where people who engage in kinky sexual activities,

fetishes and unconventional sexual practices, and that's where he met her. She had a profile page in which she described her role as mommy. "Mommy" is a term of art in that world, just as "daddy" is. And so, when he engaged in the communication with her he believed he was engaging with an adult who is offering age-play with herself and her, what we would call, "littles" is what the people in the age-play world call adult regressing to a younger age. So, what he was expecting was a threesome, basically, with consenting adults with the undercover agent would be the mommy figure, dominant figure; and two other adults would be playing the littles figures.

That is what he thought. Now, that changed. And his communication with her throughout that was consistent with that, is our position. That changed at some point during the communication when the agent sent a photograph of, presumably, of children, because I don't think there is a question about that, and then his focus changed he became suspicious. I think he had a lot of mental states at that point but he then decided that he -- his intention changed -- that he was going to get information about this woman so that he could turn it over to law enforcement, concisely. But there was sort of clues became greater and greater along the way once he got the photograph of the children and that he never intended, ultimately, to engage in enticing a minor to engage in sexual activities through the mother.

THE COURT: As you have heard me say, the interaction with -- there was the communication with the agents about the 17 and 14-year-old, I gather sisters, and what I have indicated is to the extent it can be redacted and still make sense, the references to the 17-year-old are not relevant with regard to the defendant's intent to entice a child under 17. However, the conversation with regard to the 17 and the 14-year-old, which turns to the question of did you think about reporting this to law enforcement and why didn't you report this to law enforcement, why doesn't that become relevant because of the defense which is asserted in this case, specifically that the defendant's intent changed to one to which I will call an "intent to catch a predator" and this would be some evidence bearing on this defendant's intent? Why wouldn't that come in on that basis?

MS. GALLICCHIO: So, a couple things, your Honor.

I guess we are talking about two intents here, right?

The intent -- really, the intent that is relevant in this case is did he intend to entice a 7 and 9-year-old to engage in illegal activity? That is the intent that the statute requires the government to prove, not that he intended to turn in someone that he discovered was a child molester.

THE COURT: I totally agree, that's why I asked -- I mean, for example, if you told me that's not your defense and you are not going to argue it, it would change my whole

thinking about this. So, it doesn't come in as a part of the government's case except for the fact that whether it is a fair response to the defense raised, in essence.

So, I don't think we are in disagreement on this.

MS. GALLICCHIO: Right. I guess then this raises again the question of how does the jury get charged without being -- I don't know about misled but probably confused moreso as to the relevance, in other words --

THE COURT: Well, it is a limiting instruction.

Ladies and gentlemen, this is what the law sometimes refers to as prior similar act evidence which can be considered on the question of intent. You can only — this is not charged conduct in this case, you may not convict Mr. Bright on the basis of any of this evidence. You can only consider it to the extent that you conclude that it has some bearing on his intent during the charged offense.

MS. GALLICCHIO: Right, but I guess there is two intents here. Right? There is the intent which we are talking about, there is the intent to entice a minor, right, and then there is the intent to turn him in because he is going to be, when he testifies or even in his statement to the police, he says the same thing. When he engaged in this conversation initially with this agent I intended to engage in age-play, I wasn't trying to entice a minor to engage in sexual activity.

THE COURT: Well, but whether it is by opening

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statement or examination of witnesses the defendant suggests to the jury, as I understand you desire to, that this was an intent to catch these people and turn them in to law enforcement. Now you, I assume, would tell me that the government has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the intent was to entice people, these young people into sex and an intent to turn somebody into law enforcement is inconsistent with that. Given that, my question is why isn't it a fair response for the government to say we are going to show the jury that that is not likely Mr. Bright's intent because of what he said about an unwillingness to turn a person who is engaged in prostitution to law enforcement and what appears to be an unwillingness to report that a 14-year-old was being used for sexual acts because of an opinion of his that this can break up families. All right? I am not even getting into judging whether that's a good idea or a bad idea but it's an intent that is demonstrated by what he said on another occasion. Why isn't that relevant?

MS. GALLICCHIO: No. I understand, your Honor, what you are saying. I guess what I was saying is that I think the problem is a limiting instruction would be with respect to that intent so the jury would have to say it's not relevant to whether he intended to entice a minor.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. GALLICCHIO: It is only relevant --

1 THE COURT: Yes.

MS. GALLICCHIO: That's where the confusion is and how do they separate, how does the jury separate, apply that.

THE COURT: Very easily. Very easily. Because the trial is going to go on and it is: Ladies and gentlemen, this evidence is limited to the issue. You have heard the defense say in their questioning of witnesses or in their opening statements as it was said and this only goes to that issue and not any other issue and you may only consider it on that issue. And then we move on.

Limiting instructions are a feature of trial practice, they go on in every case and juries are very smart and judges sometimes, if there is an uncertainty, the Judge repeats it or reiterates it or searches for additional words with the aid of counsel to drive home the point of the limiting instruction.

So, that's what I have to say there.

MS. GALLICCHIO: Your Honor, can I have one moment?

THE COURT: Yes.

(Counsel conferring)

MS. GALLICCHIO: So, I guess I just want to point out what I think -- so, the question of relevance becomes a question of is there similarity, meaning similarity or connection to the prior offense.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. GALLICCHIO: So, the offense charged is his intent

to report an adult who is committing crimes against another 1 2 person, right? 3 THE COURT: Right. 4 MS. GALLICCHIO: Against children. 5 THE COURT: No. Well, no. That's not actually 6 accurate. 7 MS. GALLICCHIO: The current offense, the offense 8 charged. 9 THE COURT: I see. 10 MS. GALLICCHIO: The offense charged. 11 THE COURT: I see. That is accurate. Okay. 12 MS. GALLICCHIO: That is accurate. And so the prior 13 act, the 404(b) evidence is different in that it's not a 14 scenario where he's -- it's a scenario he is refusing to or not 15 willing to report a crime but not a crime that's being committed against other people, right? It's these girls 16 17 sending, unsolicited, their photographs. Unsolicited and not 18 downloaded by him. They send pictures. He can't prevent them from sending pictures. They say -- one of them says -- the 19 20 17-year-old says I sometimes sell myself for money. Right? 21 THE COURT: Well, that's a crime. 22 MS. GALLICCHIO: That is a crime. Yes. Yes, of 23 course I agree with the Court. 24 THE COURT: All right. 25 MS. GALLICCHIO: But it's different that he is like,

look, I'm not reporting that to the police. That intent is different than the intent that we are talking about in the instant offense. They are not similar or connected in a way that makes it relevant to the intent in this case.

THE COURT: I hear your argument and you are certainly free to argue that to the jury but I have a different viewpoint on that and I want to clarify one thing that I said before and amend it, and that is what I was referring about the limiting instruction relates to the 17-year-old because I said at the outset I think it gets too off-point to get into the question of age of consent yet the age for child pornography and the like. So, that is my thought with regard to the 17-year-old and it being evidence that could be considered on intent as to enticing, wholly apart from the defense you are raising. But in the case of the 14-year-old girl, the limiting instruction would be different. You can consider on both intent and also on the defense that he was trying to catch a predator.

MS. GALLICCHIO: Can I speak briefly, your Honor, to the relevance of the prior statements regarding the 14-year-old?

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. GALLICCHIO: So, with respect to those statements, and looking through the clips, your Honor, it is certainly our position that there isn't anything about those statements regarding the 14-year-old that provide prior bad acts, that

provide anything relevant or similar to the crimes charged and that is because when you look at the clips, largely, I think the first two clips are mostly about the 17-year-old. Clip 8 he actually denies interest in the 14-year-old. If we look through them individually, clip 6 is the first one of the direct communications with the 14 and 17-year-old and that is largely -- and that actually starts on page 2, line 24, and that clip largely relates to -- it does in fact only relate to the 17-year-old, and then going to clip 7, your Honor, it is a short clip that's not even a page long, that actually doesn't even -- it mentions a 14-year-old but it has nothing to do with the 14-year-old. Clip 8, your Honor, he actually, in that clip, he denies having any sexual interest in a 14-year-old and he distinguishes age regression and age-play with what the agent is referring to.

THE COURT: You may have a point. Maybe I was right the first time in a limiting instruction should be applied to both the 17-year-old and 14-year-old.

I do want to hear the government on that one.

MS. GALLICCHIO: I just --

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. GALLICCHIO: I think if you look through -- and I don't have to go through them all, I know the Court has read them -- when you look through them there is really nothing but for the fact he received photos from her that were nude or

nudish and there is some dispute back and forth about what they are and some debate with the agents about that. There is really nothing sexual, nothing indicating that he had any sexual interest in the 14-year-old and therefore I would suggest first that it is not relevant.

THE COURT: Well, I think he describes the photos that were sent by the 14-year-old, is my recollection, and he received them.

MS. GALLICCHIO: And then deleted them.

THE COURT: And then deleted them. But, the jury is -- I mean, he was asked was it sexual and his answer, you see it on line 18 on page 13 of 23 and he is asked: Is that like the role playing is one thing? And he says: Yeah.

MS. GALLICCHIO: Right. Right, it is different. I guess my point is that he didn't do anything --

THE COURT: And he says it's just someone flirting with you.

MS. GALLICCHIO: Right.

THE COURT: And so I think that bears on the intent with regard to the charged crime because this is an instance where the 14-year-old is a 14-year-old according to what I read here and he is expressing an interest in having the 14-year-old flirt with him. That's why a jury could read it that way. They might read it another way but I certainly can read that. That's what I think the fair reading is.

MS. GALLICCHIO: I think what he is saying -- he found it flirtatious, right? But, put in context, if you look at the whole picture here, he says she's a stupid teenager, I'm not interested in her, it has nothing do with my age-play, she sends me a picture, I delete it, I didn't ask her for any pictures. There is nothing about this that makes it more probable that then, on May 22nd or whatever the date of this case is, he intended to entice a minor to engage in sexual activity.

THE COURT: Yeah, it does. Yeah, it really does. In my mind I think a jury could find that, that this person -- so, let's just read this here.

MS. GALLICCHIO: Which one, Judge?

THE COURT: I am on page 13 of 23, 36-1: This is the defendant speaking: Like I say, the text with the messages with the 17-year-old and the 14-year-old were flirty, I would say. I didn't know what to make of her sex-for-money thing, like.

SPIVACK: So the texts with the 14-year-old were also flirty?

DEFENDANT: Yeah, you know, she was basically saying, oh, like you know, English accents are so sexy and that kind of thing.

SPIVACK: Did the 14-year-old ever send you a pic?

DEFENDANT: I think she sent me pictures but it's

1 deleted as well. 2 What did she send you? SPIVACK: 3 ADAMCZYK: What was the picture? 4 DEFENDANT: I don't even remember. It was like her, 5 in, like, little -- it was her in, like --SPIVACK: Was it sexual? 6 7 DEFENDANT: Panties and a t-shirt. SPIVACK: Panties and a t-shirt? 8 9 DEFENDANT: Like, yeah. 10 ADAMCZYK: So here's the, like, role playing is one 11 thing? 12 DEFENDANT: Yeah, but like why talk to a 14 and 13 17-year-old, like why do you even -- why even entertain that. 14 SPIVACK: Especially if she's sending you panty pics. 15 DEFENDANT: Yeah, it's kind of flattering to be -just have someone flirt with you. 16 17 I think that bears on intent. It will be a question 18 for the jury, not for me to decide, but a reasonable jury could 19 conclude that that indicates that this person is open to 20 engaging young minors. 21 MS. GALLICCHIO: So, assuming the Court is obviously 22 finding the relevance of it I would say then the next step we 23 look at is that relevance, is it outweighed by the unfair 24 prejudice that it would create in a jury's mind, right, based 25 on our position is obviously no relevance but the relevance

that the Court has identified that he had a flirty conversation with a 14-year-old who, unsolicited, sent him a photograph.

Right? That certainly is -- so it can be inflammatory, right?

And so, I would suggest that the probative value is outweighed by what would be substantial prejudice.

THE COURT: All right. Now, one of the things we do in this Second Circuit, and you are an experienced criminal practitioner in this court house, is we look at whether this evidence is more inflammatory than evidence just tending to prove the indictment in this case and if, for example, you had maybe some a kind of a drug transaction and you were trying to offer prior similar act evidence that was going to get into a murder or a torturing somebody, you would say the probative value of that evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice in the case. Here, this is not anymore inflammatory than the charge and the evidence in the case. So, I conclude that the danger of unfair prejudice does not substantially outweigh its probative value.

MS. GALLICCHIO: Understood, your Honor.

I think with respect to that, those very clips and in particular clip 10 I did have another objection.

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. GALLICCHIO: When you are ready.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MS. GALLICCHIO: The other objection I had, your

which is on page --

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Honor, was with respect to, particularly I think it was clip 10

THE COURT: I have it here, 17 to 23.

MS. GALLICCHIO: Yes; that throughout this clip, through a good portion of it it does appear that the agents are, first of all, cutting Mr. Bright off consistently from giving his answers, giving their opinions, expressing their skepticism and their judgments over what he says.

THE COURT: I agree with you and I think I would like the government to knock that out throughout the post-arrest statements. We don't care what Spivack or anyone else thinks, There may be some, because this is a video Adamczyk. interview, where it is necessary to come in for context but you and your client are entitled to a limiting instruction and you should remind me, in the event I forget it, that the views of Mr. Spivack and Mr. Adamczyk are utterly irrelevant and not to be considered by you as evidence. Their opinions or commentary on the conduct is not part of this case and may not be considered by you as evidence of anything.

So, I agree with you. I have a similar reaction and so the government has to cut it to the bone where they knock off the commentary because there is opinions in there and they're not relevant.

MS. GALLICCHIO: And that was with respect to -- I raise it with respect to another portion which was clip 11

which doesn't have to do with the 404(b) but.

THE COURT: Same point. I agree with you.

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Now, I have done a lot of talking, you have done a lot of talking. Is there anything else anybody wants to say with regard to the government's motion in limine? And then we will talk about the defendant's evidence.

MR. LI: Your Honor, are you including within that question the motion in limine as to the expert?

THE COURT: No. Not really. I wasn't really considering that. I was considering that more of a defendant point but technically I guess it is in your *in limine*. Exclude that for the moment.

MR. LI: Then nothing else for the moment, your Honor.

THE COURT: Nothing else with regard to the statements the government want to get in. Is there anything further from anybody about the statements the government wants to get in?

MS. GALLICCHIO: No, your Honor. I think we have covered it.

THE COURT: All right. I don't know if this is helpful or hurtful but there are different ways to go about judging. One is pretend that you haven't read the papers and you haven't learned anything from the papers and just turn to counsel and say, What do you want to tell me? and What do you want to tell me? and we go back and forth and then I lay a

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ruling on you. And I think sometimes lawyers like that better but it's not as productive as my giving you a reaction and you're trying to talk me out of it, which is what you are paid to do, what your ethical obligation is to do.

So, I have thought a lot about the testimony of Dr. Cantor and I have read the January 28, 2020 letter several times and Dr. Cantor says that he will testify about the concept of age-play and he will also testify about the general characteristics and behaviors of pedophiles and the opinion that there is no relationship between engaging in age-play and committing an illegal sex acts against a minor or desiring sex with a minor. And the important point under Daubert and Kumho Tire and the Second Circuit's decision in the criminal context which is United States v. Williams, 506 F.3d 151, it is with opinions based on science and technology, there has to be a reliable methodology that the Court looks to whether or not the testimony is grounded on sufficient facts or data, the testimony is product of reliable principles and methods, and that the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. Other factors bearing on reliability, whether a theory or technique has been or can be tested, whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication, the techniques known or potential rate of error and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation and whether a particular

technique or theory has gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific community and those are not exclusive factors.

It seems to me that testimony defining so-called age-play is akin to what the prosecution often offers in cases involving LCN or DTO -- LCN being La Cosa Nostra, DTO being drug trafficking organizations -- where a witness takes the stand and says, well, in my general experience this is what the elements of a drug trafficking organization are, and this is what a capo is, and this is what a soldier is, and this is what an associate is, and this is what a consiglieri is, and this is what an underboss is, and this is what a boss is.

So, I am inclined to allow Dr. Cantor to take the stand and say there is something called age-based role play and this is what age-based role play is. However, I do not believe that there is a basis for Dr. Cantor to offer opinions about the characteristics of pedophiles, the likelihood that a pedophile would engage in age-based role play or whether or not the willingness to gauge in such role play is predictive or not of whether somebody will engage in bad conduct. And, listen, I know and I believe that analogies are often times imperfect but let's say someone is charged with committing a murder with a .38 caliber weapon and a .38 caliber weapon is found in the person's home. And putting aside issues of ballistics but the argument is most people who own .38 caliber weapons do not

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murder people and, specifically, if you are the owner of a .38 caliber weapon and you go to a pistol range once a month, you are a responsible gun owner and it makes it highly unlikely that you would commit a murder. That sort of evidence is most emphatically inadmissible.

The nature of criminal conduct is, it is aberrational relative to society at large and the fact that most people, many people, 95 percent of all people, if he could opine to this and there is no basis disclosed in the notice that the defendant has, but if he could say that I have done a study and 95 percent of the people who engage in age-based role play where they pretend to be engaging with a 7-year-old or a 4-year-old in sexual banter but in fact they're engaging with an adult, most of these people are 96 percent unlikely to commit a crime, that testimony wouldn't be admissible, most likely, because the question before this jury is whether this person did engage in a crime. One could call a witness who would say 99 percent of the population don't engage in this crime. 99.9 percent of the U.S. population doesn't engage in this sort of crime. That testimony is not relevant to whether this defendant committed this crime but Dr. Cantor isn't even close to that because he does not disclose, and the defendant has not disclosed, a reliable methodology.

So, the only point that his testimony will be allowed, unless somebody wants to try and talk me out of this and that's

what I invited, is on the limited question of what is age-based role play.

MS. BAHARANYI: I would like to attempt to, your Honor, talk you out of that.

THE COURT: And I think the government is probably going to try and talk me out of it too. There you go. Part of it, at least.

MS. BAHARANYI: Your Honor, I think I would like to turn to a case that I think is particularly helpful here, United States v. Joseph, which we cited in our papers. It addresses the issue of Dr. Cantor's qualifications and what he can testify to. He is not held to the same standard as those who are experts in hard sciences, for example. His expertise is in human psychology, in human sexuality. It is a social science and United States v. Joseph addresses the standard that applies to experts who are admitted or seek to be admitted on the basis of some sort of expertise in social sciences just like Dr. Cantor. And there they said the question, whether — excuse me. Social science research theories and opinions cannot have the exactness, the exactness of hard science methodologies.

So, when we are talking about his ability to give an opinion and to educate on this area of age-play as well as pedophilia, this Second Circuit case is saying don't look to whether he has the same sort of -- the same methodologies that

we would expect in the scientific context, the hard science context. Look at the other parts of his qualifications that I do think are laid out in his papers and his CV that was provided to the government through the government's motion as well. He has extensive experience both treating and interviewing people who engage in age-play who have alternative sexual interests, age-play being one of them. He has extensive experience treating and engaging with individuals who have pedophilia, which is a desire to have sex with children. I think his exponential experience in this area that is not quite like chemistry, not quite like biology, but is this social science makes him more than qualified to give a jury not just a definition of things like age-play as well as pedophilia but to opine, as well, on the relationship between the two.

The other part I would like to address --

THE COURT: Well, now apply that to a social scientist who has studied gun owners and murderers and he opines that a gun owner who is careful enough to go to a pistol range on a monthly basis to keep his skills up, who has gone to safety training, is extremely unlikely to commit a murder.

Would you allow that if you were the Judge?

MS. BAHARANYI: Your Honor, if there is some documented sort of research of the psychology of gun owners and we know this person who is this expert in gun owners, treats them, interviews them, engages with them over the past 20 years

on a daily basis and has amassed this expertise that may not be, you know, akin to what we see in another science but he has amassed this expertise here from those interviews, that experience, then I would say that might be possible.

THE COURT: Spoken like a good defense counsel.

MS. BAHARANYI: And that's what we have here. He has a tremendous amount of experience, again laid out more thoroughly in the papers. We are happy to provide additional briefing on that as well, your Honor.

and you have not disclosed a reliable methodology at all. You have disclosed a man's qualifications and experience but this is not binary in the sense that does he have expertise? Yes. You are welcome to opine in any area you would like or, no, you can't opine on anything, or you can't testify at all. It doesn't quite work like that. In my opinion there has to be —I just went through a moment ago, from United States v.

Williams, the Circuit went through many of the factor present in the Daubert analysis in the context of a criminal case.

Okay, but you have another point so let me not stop you there.

MS. BAHARANYI: Your Honor, just briefly on that same point before I move forward. I do think that the Second Circuit has established a different approach to sort of 702 and the admissibility of expert testimony and a more liberal

approach than, perhaps, other circuits. This is not a case that we provided to the Court but I would like to give the cite in case it is helpful. This is in Washington v. Kellwood, it is a district case out of this district, your Honor, the cite is 105 F.Supp. 3d 293.

THE COURT: Just one second, please. Go ahead.

MS. BAHARANYI: 105 F.Supp. 3d 293, and I will point you to a particular part of that case that I think is relevant.

THE COURT: Magistrate Judge Dolinger. Yes, I have it.

MS. BAHARANYI: Judge Dolinger, at 305, I think the Court gives a good summary or explanation of what the standard in the Circuit is that, in the Second Circuit, and I will quote, the Second Circuit liberally construes expert qualification requirements in consideration of the thrust of the federal rules and their general relaxation of traditional bearers to opinion testimony.

I think that, along with what we see in *Joseph* with an expert who is qualified to testify, qualified to testify based off of a similar subject matter, sort of role playing in the Internet chat room whose qualifications are based, in part, on his interviews with individuals and his clinical experience. I think we had something similar in this case that perhaps, under a stringent 702 test, that expert in *Joseph* would not have been able to or the Court would not have advised that he could

testify. But we are in this world of social sciences, we are in this world where the Second Circuit says we sort of want to encourage this sort of testimony and we are in this world where we are asking for Mr. Bright to be able to present a defense, as is his constitutional right, and I think the combination of all of those factors means we have to be a bit more liberal with how we view the qualifications of Dr. Cantor. It doesn't require much liberality because he is quite in fact very thoroughly qualified and has tremendous experience, it is just not the same that we see in certain other sciences. And the Second Circuit has recognized that that's okay. Other districts in the circuit — other courts in the circuit have recognized that that's okay.

But for the second point, your Honor --

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. BAHARANYI: -- if I can address that?

THE COURT: Sure.

MS. BAHARANYI: Brief court's indulgence?

THE COURT: Go ahead.

(Counsel conferring)

MS. BAHARANYI: I think the second point, your Honor, goes to Dr. Cantor's ability to explain the typical practices, the manners, the norms of individuals who actually engage in sex with children or have a desire to engage in sex with children. I know your Honor has mentioned that that might be

1 beyond what you would allow Dr. Cantor to testify to --

THE COURT: No, I think I said that would be beyond what I would allow him to testify to subject to hearing why I shouldn't. Not a might but I would not allow it.

MS. BAHARANYI: That's why I would ask your Honor to reconsider his 20 plus years of experience, research experience as well, has been focused on the norms, the manners, the behaviors of individuals who do in fact desire to have sex with children. The government has alleged that our client,

Mr. Bright, is an individual who wanted to have sex with a 7-year-old and 9-year-old when he showed up at a meeting with an undercover last May. That Dr. Cantor can provide an explanation — not an explanation, an education to the jury on how those individuals typically behave, how they typically find their victims, how they typically groom their victims. It is relevant here because the jury will hear from not just our evidence but from the government's evidence that what

Mr. Bright was doing last May was very different. I think that this is the sort of —

THE COURT: Well, is the government offering an expert?

MR. LI: We are not, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead.

MS. BAHARANYI: Through the government's evidence through the post-arrest statements they intend to introduce,

the conduct from the messages from the undercover they intend to introduce. The way in which Mr. Bright engaged, communicated with the undercover, is not the way in which someone who is actually desiring sex with children typically engages or communicates. And so that's something -- the expert can give that education without opining on the ultimate issue -- we will ensure that he steers clear of that -- but can give the sort of background information the jury needs to hear to be able to say whether this conduct, whether what the government is alleging is Mr. Bright's conduct is really consistent with that of someone who wants to have sex with children, who has that intent to have sex with children.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Let me hear from the government.

MR. LI: Your Honor, if I can just begin with the Joseph case that the defense has pointed us to? I think the difference between this case and the Joseph case is that the Second Circuit was able to conduct at least a preliminary Daubert analysis because it knew what the opinions were that were being proffered and it knew what the bases were for those opinions.

In the *Joseph* case the proposed expert was going to testify about chat room practices which he had done studies on; he a had done his Ph.D research on this area, proffered he had done studies in this area, and the Court was able to say, well,

based on that experience that you have in this specific area of chat room fetish exploration you can testify about this.

This is something totally different. We do not know from the notice what Dr. Cantor's opinions are about age play, what is the defining characteristics of an age-player. What are the defining characteristics of a pedophile. What is the relationship, if any, between the two concepts. We just don't know from the notice much less the bases for those opinions.

I will add on this point, your Honor, that since the filling of the papers the government has tried to figure out what Dr. Cantor might say by looking at the literature in the CV that the defendant gave us and also looking at the Dr. Cantor's website. We have not been able to find any research, published research, that he has put out there on age-play. As far as we can tell, the thrust of his research seems to be on the biological characteristics of pedophiles. So, he studies pedophiles; he puts them in MRI machines, he has been able to do correlation analyses that correlate pedophilia with brain matter, with left-handedness, with IQ, with height. This is not the kind of characteristics of a pedophile, I think, that the defense is going to be trying to offer and certainly that kind of characteristic, that kind of biological characteristic would not be relevant to this case.

So, I think for purposes of this Court's analysis which is the Daubert analysis, there is really nothing to go

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off of. We don't know what the expert's opinions are and we don't know what the bases are and it is the proponent of expert testimony's burden to show the Court that expert evidence is admissible and we don't believe the defense has met that burden here.

THE COURT: Thank you. I adhere to my proposed ruling.

There remains the question of voir dire. Let me say that attorneys are welcome and will be welcome at this trial to propose areas of further follow-up. Everyone has had the opportunity to submit proposed voir dire to the Court and the Court is taking that into account, in framing its questions of jurors, but the proposal, which quite precisely is giving the government and giving the defense a 30-minute blank check to conduct voir dire, of course with the opportunity of either side to jump up and say, Your Honor, that's an outrageous question to ask. You should strike it. It's irrelevant. Etc. is, in a case like this, a recipe for disaster and the oddity of this is that, what persuades me of this is something that defense counsel wrote and wrote quite well and eloquently and with which I agree: This case presents a number of sensitive issues which require careful and precise juror questioning to uncover biases and prejudices. Undoubtedly, many prospective jurors will have strong feelings about the charge in this case. Without careful questioning which is informed by a thorough and

specific knowledge of the facts of the case, these biases may well remain undetected.

It is precisely for the reasons, therein, that I am disinclined to have attorney-conducted voir dire on the basis of you have 30 minutes, try not to ask any objectionable questions and we will see how it goes. So, I'm not going to do that. I will do my best to interview the jury. Jurors who have affirmative responses will come to the side bar, we will talk about it. I often will have the juror stand back and then have some interaction with counsel to see if there is any follow-up or what their positions are based on the responses given. My experience is the jurors will speak and I will get them to speak and the question is whether what they have said indicates that they can be a fair and impartial juror and fair to both sides or they can't, based on what they've said.

So, that's where I am on that.

I have indicated that we are going to start the trial on Tuesday morning because of the funeral service for Judge

Batts and --

MS. GALLICCHIO: Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes. Go ahead.

MS. GALLICCHIO: I'm sorry. I think one issue is remaining and that was the defense 404(b).

THE COURT: Oh. You are so right. You are so right.

MS. GALLICCHIO: I hate to skip that, but.

THE COURT: No. No. No. We should not skip that. We should not skip that at all. I am getting ahead of myself and you are quite right.

So, the defense has tendered a number of transcripts or partial transcripts which they say indicate a desire or intent to engage in age-based role play with an older person.

My review of the transcripts, at least as far as I could tell, that was explicit in one of the transcripts but not in all of them.

Let me hear the government's view on whether I should allow that evidence in and, if not, why not.

MR. LI: Your Honor, our view is that this is not probative of the defendant's intent in this case. The government does not contest, there is no dispute that the defendant has an interest in age-play. Frankly, from our perspective, we don't care. The question is not whether he was engaged in age-play on some other occasions or whether he is interested in age-play in general. The question is simply whether he intended, in this particular instance, to actually entice minors for sexual activity or as the defense as I understand it will argue, that in fact he was actually trying to engage in sexual activities with adults pretending to be children.

THE COURT: One moment, please.

(pause)

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THE COURT: Go ahead.

2 So in our view, the fact that he may have, on MR. LI: 3 five occasions or a hundred occasions previously engaged in consenting age role-play with adults does not bear on the 4 5 question at all of whether he, on this particular occasion, 6 intended to entice a child for sexual activity. It seems 7 simply like all the other prior good act evidence that a defendant could offer, in any criminal case, that on other 8 9 prior occasions that defendant did not engage in criminal 10 activity to prove that on this occasion they did not engage in criminal activity, it is propensity evidence pure and simple. 11

THE COURT: Let me hear from the defense.

MS. GALLICCHIO: Yes, thank you.

We are not offering this as character evidence as we have outlined in our papers, your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, because if it was character evidence it would be inadmissible so are you not offering it for that. I know that.

MS. GALLICCHIO: Right, but it's other acts which are relevant to the issue of intent and motive just like the government's 404(b). I know it is unusual for the defense to seek to offer it but it is — the rule does not preclude the defense from offering prior acts on the issue of intent.

THE COURT: I agree with you. Just so the record is clear, I do not see a limitation in Rule 404(b) and there is at

least one case in which a defendant has done so or sought to do so relating to 404(b) evidence relating to a co-conspirator. So, on that point, I'm not seeing a limitation in the Rule that would foreclose you from offering it.

MS. GALLICCHIO: Right.

So, with respect to -- we are not offering this evidence I think that the government was objecting to. We are not saying that on a prior occasion in which he had an opportunity, he was in a situation where he could have committed a crime against a minor and didn't. That's prior good acts. Right? He was in a scenario -- with some of the cases, the Scarpa case had that scenario; the Benedetto case as well discusses where, on prior occasions, the defendant did not engage in criminal activity under any circumstances in which he could have. This is different. That's character, this is different.

We are not saying only these five instances here but we just selected a small sampling of his history of age-play that it goes to just like prior bad acts go to intent, this also addresses intent or motive in this case because it is our theory of the case, your Honor, that he intended to engage in age-play, that he intended to communicate with this undercover officer to have a sexual encounter.

THE COURT: But this is where one of the parts where your proffer starts to fall apart, in my view.

So, this is not a criminal charge of directly interacting with two young people. This was a situation where the trial evidence will be that the defendant interacted with an adult and at no time did the adult indicate that the adult planned to impersonate any child. That was never, from what I understand the evidence, that will not come out that the special agent impersonating the mother claimed that she was going to put on some role play impersonating a 7-year-old and a 4-year-old. That's very different than what we are dealing with here.

MS. GALLICCHIO: Well, what she was proposing is that she would have her companions; she would be the mother figure of her companions who would play the role of her children.

THE COURT: Well, I tell you what. If that's the way the testimony comes out then at the close of the government's case you will point to that evidence and I will consider this issue but you may not bring it out in opening or refer to these transcripts in questioning of witnesses.

MS. GALLICCHIO: So, just some clarification, Judge.

I understand from the government that they have no objection and I guess I need to know the Court's ruling, of course, whether witnesses can testify. We can question witnesses about the fact that one, they, for example, for the agent, they searched his phone, they saw that he has a history of engaging in age-play, or if Mr. Bright testifies he can

testify to the fact that, I engaged in age-play, I'm an age player.

THE COURT: I am absolutely going to allow that. I am absolutely going to allow that. That is different in kind and character than I think what you are proposing and it may be, if that testimony comes in, it may influence a ruling on your seeking to get these transcripts in but we are not up to that at this stage of the game.

MS. GALLICCHIO: Okay. I think, just to be clear, I wasn't -- I'm not suggesting that the agent -- the agent is not going to say I was role-playing, of course. My client believed in his mind, it was his state of mind that she was engaging -- she and her friends would be engaging in role-playing. She was role-playing, her friends were age-playing, and so he believed that's who he was communicating with.

THE COURT: He can definitely take -- nothing I am saying implies in any way, shape, or form that I would preclude him from so testifying. And then it may be that I will also allow in these transcripts, but on the record as it stands now this is, in my view, akin to what we have seen in some cases where fraudulent intent is an issue and the claim is that with knowledge of falsity, a person prepared multiple asylum applications. And to rebut that evidence and contention of intent, they offered evidence of the many occasions in which they prepared asylum applications that were 100 percent

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truthful and accurate. And that evidence is not admissible. It is, actually, I don't consider it character evidence but I consider it propensity evidence; that it's more of a propensity to do the right thing on other occasions. The fact that a defendant has engaged in conduct that is not unlawful on other occasions does not speak to whether or not the conduct he engaged in on this occasion was lawful or not. And I see a big difference between this evidence and the evidence the government is offering because it really is through the lens of evidence that is otherwise coming in. The evidence of the conversations with the agent are coming in and this sheds light on that and I don't see where the transcripts of your client engaging in age-related role play does because there was no one here who was, at least so far as the transcripts or least so far as I understand the evidence, will come out that they were proposing to impersonate children.

Now, if that evidence comes out, I may change my inclination.

MS. GALLICCHIO: No. I don't expect that the agent will say -- well, I don't know. The agent is not going to say she intended to impersonate but it is what my client believed, it is what his mental state was.

THE COURT: Well, he is allowed to take the stand and testify to his mental state. I think that's perfectly his right.

MS. GALLICCHIO: Right. And he actually also, it is clear in his statement to the police and his recorded interrogation statement he does give that defense which will come out in the government's case-in-chief. I intend largely, my expectation is, or our hope would be, through his testimony we would offer it.

So, I understand the Court's ruling that you are, at this point, denying it, but I would like him to be able to -- and I see the government not objecting -- to be able to testify that he has engaged in age-play before and give examples, through testimony, without using the transcript and tell the Court, unless and until the Court allows it.

THE COURT: Right. That, offhand, I believe you are entitled to do that.

Any objection from the government?

MR. LI: No objection, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So, I will see you -- I would like you to get here at 9:30 on Tuesday morning. I don't know how long we are going to wait for jurors, but if there are any last minute issues we can take them up.

The schedule of the trial will be from 10:00 to 1:00, an hour off for lunch, 2:00 to 5:00. If it gets to be 10 minutes to 5:00, call your next witness. If you don't have a witness, reserve the right to conclude that you are resting your case. And the reason I do this is because I am focused on

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the jury and the sacrifice that our jurors make in serving and it is important that I work hard and the lawyers work hard in using the jurors' time judiciously.

I will just say this week on Monday I had to wait for civil jurors. I didn't get my jurors up into the courtroom until 11:00 and we had a trial in which there were, I think, five witnesses. We had openings, the five witnesses, closings, and the Court's instructions, and it was in the hands of the jury by 4:00 p.m. the second day.

So, criminal cases are a little different; the voir dire takes longer but that's what I anticipate here.

How long is the government's direct case going to take?

MR. LI: Your Honor, we anticipate calling four witnesses; two will be very, very short witnesses. My guess is we will finish -- setting aside cross-examination -- but the government's case will probably be done within a day.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. I think I excluded time through Monday. Anybody want to exclude time through Tuesday?

MR. LI: Your Honor, we will make the motion.

The government respectfully asks the Court to exclude time until Tuesday in the interest of justice for the parties to prepare for trial.

THE COURT: Any objection?

MS. GALLICCHIO: No, your Honor.

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THE COURT: Okay. I find that the ends of justice will be served by granting a continuance until Tuesday, February 11th, and the need for the continuance outweighs the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

The reasons for my finding are that the time is needed to enable the Court to honor his good friend, the Honorable Deborah Batts, who served this Court for 25 years and gave this Judge a lot of joy in life.

So, that's the reason.

MS. GALLICCHIO: Absolutely, your Honor.

THE COURT: So, time is included until Tuesday morning.

Anything else?

MR. LI: Nothing from the government, your Honor.

MS. GALLICCHIO: I'm sorry, Judge, just with regard to scheduling. Can I just get a -- we are flying in Dr. Cantor from Canada so I expect that -- I know.

THE COURT: You will have to talk to the government on that. You will have to see how Tuesday goes. You can also talk to the government about the possibility of his testifying out of order if there is a jam. Such things have happened before and usually counsel on either side are reasonable about such things.

MS. GALLICCHIO: Very well.

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K275briC conference THE COURT: All right. Have a very, very pleasant weekend and see you on Tuesday morning. MS. GALLICCHIO: You as well. MR. LI: Thank you, your Honor.